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The tendency to use technologies without fully understanding the potential 
ramifications extends to all reaches of our lives. Digital forensics is not immune 
from this phenomenon. This paper discusses some past scenarios in which 
conclusions were drawn before all of the testing was complete. Digital forensics 
tools are then discussed including tool capabilities, tool analysis, and associated 
challenges. It identifies some potential issues and ramifications that may not be 
given appropriate consideration by digital forensic examiners or those who rely on 
these tools when weighing evidence. It concludes with some suggestions for future 
research directions that could answer some important questions about using digital 
forensics tools effectively. 
 






Throughout history, early adopters have flocked to new technologies and ideas and 
subsequently led throngs of new users to the same experiences. In the absence of a 
devil’s advocate, the promises made by the technology creators are often taken at 
face-value. The creators will emphasize the features and capabilities that make the 
technology marketable and useful. However, they may not mention, or mention 
only in passing, the problems that the technology has—if indeed they know what 
these problems are. And as they rarely know all the characteristics of the 
environments in which the technology will be used, the creators may not be able to 
know all the problems that the technology will have during its lifetime. Thus, as 
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important as questioning technology is, it is even more important to ask the right 
questions.  
 
Cigarettes – Our Past 
 
Until the 1950s, cigarettes were generally considered benign. Doctors said they 
helped soothe coughs and raw throats; movie stars and other celebrities made their 
use seem attractive and sexy. Cigarette manufacturers built advertising campaigns 
around these claims, and became very wealthy from the sales of tobacco products. 
But evidence that smoking could cause diseases and death mounted, and in 1964, 
the U.S. Surgeon-General published a report warning of dangers of smoking. 
Beginning in 1966, all cigarette packs sold in the United States were required to 
carry warnings about the hazards of cigarette smoking (from “may be hazardous to 
your health” to “causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may complicate 
pregnancy”). 
 
According to documents released as a result of lawsuits and other legal processes, 
by the 1960s the tobacco industry had shown that cigarettes caused cancer in 
animals (Glantz et al., 1998). The industry’s response was to take steps to minimize 
exposure to lawsuits, in part by concealing the evidence uncovered in their 
laboratories. The result of believing the claims that no evidence linked smoking to 
disease and death led to a lack of understanding of the problems, and the 
consequences were indeed disease and death. 
 
Airline Scanners – Our Present 
 
The U.S Transportation Security Agency (TSA) acquired scanning devices that use 
X-rays to produce an image of a person standing in the machine. The intent was to 
have devices that enabled TSA personnel to look for weapons in clothing without 
patting down the passenger. The devices were controversial for a number of 
reasons. The one that concerns us here is safety; there was considerable concern 
that the safety of the systems had not been properly tested. Four doctors at the 
University of California San Francisco, who are experts in cancer and medical 
imaging (and three of whom are members of the National Academy of Sciences), 
sent the Office of Science and Technology Policy a letter requesting a scientific 
study of this issue. The TSA’s report, written by experts at the Johns Hopkins 
Advanced Physics Laboratory, states that the devices are safe if configured and 
used properly. Another part of the controversy concerned the storage of the images 
for later use. 
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Unfortunately, the TSA’s study is obscured in places. Specifically, there is little to 
no detail available on the software test procedures, the source code analysis 
procedures, and indeed on any penetration tests in which the goal of the testers is 
to subvert the software to (for example) fail to provide proper interlocking, to 
deliver a dangerously high dose of radiation, or to enable images to be stored or 
transmitted. Further, while the TSA claimed that images could not be stored, the 
same devices were used for courthouse security in Florida, and in that case images 
were stored. Thus, the question that should have been asked was whether the 
devices were safe and privacy-protecting as configured and used in the airports, 
and how that safety and privacy- preservation was assured in that environment 
(Mowery et al., 2014; Applied Physics Laboratory, 2009). 
 
Cloud Technology – Our Future 
 
The race to the cloud is another example of a new technology that is being widely 
adopted without appropriate consideration of the associated issues. While there are 
likely to be early adopters of most promising new technologies, cloud technologies 
have mandated adoption based on financial considerations with little or no 
associated identification of issues. As a part of The Accountable Government 
Initiative, Vivek Kundra, the U.S. Chief Information Officer, identified a “Cloud 
First” policy; requiring each U.S. agency to identify 3 “must move” systems within 
three months and move one to the cloud within 12 months (The White House, 
2010). This very short window, coupled with the lack of understanding of the 
implications of using cloud technologies demonstrates a fundamental willingness 
to adopt now and evaluate later.  
 
In the years since the ubiquitous use of multi-tenancy public cloud environments 
has become common there have been many cases in which the isolation between 
instances has been shown to be more fragile than initially thought.  Cloud 
cartography and instance co-location efforts (Ristenpart, Tromer, et al., 2009) have 
demonstrated the ability to map a cloud environment and place adversarial 
instances in close proximity to targets.  The hardware enhancements that have 
driven increased processing power for many years have also been shown to also 
have significant security implications. For example, timing attacks against shared 
resources such as caches;  Spectre, Meltdown (Graz University of Technology, 
2019) and the wide range of similar attacks that have resulted from an increased 
level of research into hardware vulnerabilities. 
 
Software issues are no less prevalent in the cloud than elsewhere, but cloud 
environments suffer from very real supply chain issues.  Images for almost any use 
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case and software product are easy to find, but significant effort is then required to 
determine where the image came from, and how it was configured. 
 
Even configuring security controls on resources has proven to be a challenge, with 
S3 buckets and open databases full of PII or commercial data frequently found 
exposed to the Internet with no access controls.  While it is easy to place the blame 
for such incidents on the data owners and administrators,  cloud providers’ simple 
“click to deploy” interfaces make it quick and easy to create working instances, 
while the more nuanced security configuration is left as an option that can be easily 
overlooked or misconfigured (particularly when dealing with large or dynamic 
environments). 
 
This tendency to use technologies without fully understanding the ramifications 
extends to all reaches of our lives. Digital forensics is not immune from this 
phenomenon. The motivations may be different as the objectives are more likely 
motivated by simplifying the process for the forensics examiner rather than 
lowering costs. The following sections discuss some digital forensic tools in this 
light and identify some potential issues and ramifications that may not be given 
appropriate consideration by digital forensic examiners or those who rely on these 
tools when weighing evidence. 
 
 
DIGITAL FORENSICS TOOLS 
 
While digital forensics used to be applied primarily to computer crime, the 
increasing predominance of electronic devices in all areas of our lives has 
contributed to a world where crimes that could not be informed by digital 
components are rare indeed. A mobile phone in the pocket of a burglar, the gps in 
the car used to escape from the crime scene, the red-light camera that snapped photo 
of the getaway all have the potential to provide valuable evidence to exonerate or 




The need to validate tools for the end user has been discussed in the academic and 
popular press for many years. NIST announced the Computer Forensics Tool 
Testing Program (CFTT), which is a very positive step in the validation of forensics 
tools. The effort involves major law enforcement players in the digital forensics 
realm and includes the capability for you to test your own tool using their 
methodology. The overall objective is to “provide forensics tool testing reports to 
the public.” The reports are designed to provide test results with the information 
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needed to allow 1) developers to improve tools, 2) users to make informed choices, 
and 3) the legal community and others to understand the tools’ capabilities 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019).  
The site currently contains reports in the following digital forensics areas:  
 
• Deleted File Recovery and Active File Listing (last update 7/14)  
• Digital Data Acquisition (last update 7/14)  
• Disk Imaging (last update 10/16)  
• Forensics Media Preparation (Last update 12/11)  
• Graphic File Carving (last update 7/14)  
• Hardware Write Block (9/09)  
• Mobile Device Acquisition (12/17)  
• Software Write Block (1/08)  
• Video File Carving (10/14)  
 
The software industry tends to use a release-and-patch approach for software. This 
includes tools used in the digital forensics arena. As can be seen in the listing of 
forensics areas for which tool validation reports are published, the lag time in 
updating the tests is significant. This lack of currency greatly decreases the benefits 
of the reports to digital forensic examiners.  
 
In addition to the lack of currency, there is also a limit to the breadth of the tools 
that have been tested. The focus for the majority of the tools in the reports had been 
file systems forensics. File systems forensics represent an important subset of the 
critical digital forensic information that is needed for digital forensics analysts to 
understand. Missing from the categories are memory forensics, network forensics, 
cloud forensics, and the plethora of device forensics that are not encompassed in 
the mobile device family.  
 
Perhaps the reporting mechanism, which is a very important step in advancing the 
state of validation of digital forensics tools, could be partially addressed by the 
formalization of a process for continuous evolution of the site contents if it is to be 
the definitive resource in this area. A plan for maintaining currency would include 
retesting of tools as new updates are released and method for evolution of the 
categories as the field of digital forensics continues to advance.  
 
The following section provides some examples of specific digital forensics tools 
and some associated issues that might affect the appropriateness of their application 
to digital forensics cases.  
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Graphic File Carving Tools - Encase and FTK 
 
The Encase 6.18.0.59 graphic file carving tool is one of the tools tested in 2014 
with a report available on the CFTT site (Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
The test was run with 40 graphic files. While there were only 40 files, 62 were 
carved, with 33 of the carved files being viewable (3 only partially). The rest of the 
files were either not-viewable gif files (4) or 25 false positives.  
 
The FTK 4.1 graphic file carving tool was also tested in 2014 (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2014). The same 40 files were used and with this tool only 39 
were carved. Of the files carved, 33 were viewable, 3 were partially viewable, and 
3 were not viewable. The files not viewable were again gif files. There is no 
indication that they are the same 3 files in both tools.  
 
What is it about the gif files that made them none viewable? Is it something that a 
criminal or state actor could investigate, discover and then include that attribute in 
their images? It would be beneficial to see the evolution of the tool and the 
associated tests in one chain to demonstrate the responsiveness of the organization 
in responding to issues identified in the validation testing process. Further, a 
subsequent validation of a more recent release may have concluded that this is no 
longer an issue.  
 
NIST Tool Catalog  
 
NIST hosts a list of tools that developers can self-register (“Computer Forensics 
Tools & Techniques Catalog - Home,” 2019). Many tools are listed without having 
a report of the tool being tested. In fact, of the 243 tools listed on the site, only 56 
of them state they have a report. Of those, only 34 have working links to actual 
reports. Of the 34 reports, many of those date back to 2012 and earlier. Most of the 
tools have gone through at least one revision since their report date.  
 
Tools listed on the NIST Tools Catalog site have an implied validation. It is likely 
that people seeing a tool listed on the site will assume that the tool is appropriate 
for use in a digital forensics investigation. And perhaps it is, but without proper 
testing and validation, one cannot be sure and the time to find out should not be in 
the middle of a criminal investigation.  
 
Another concern is how tools are registered with the site. A form is filled out by a 
tool developer and submitted. A person at NIST reviews the submission and then 
determines if it should be posted. The rubric through which this decision is made is 
not clear. Is it possible that a sophisticated hacker or state sponsored group could 
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create a set of infected tools and have them posted to the site? This possibility 
motivates additional testing of the tools beyond operational validation.  
 
As discussed above, there have been some steps taken towards improving the 
availability of information about tools and some vendors have allowed their tools 
to be tested through the CFTT process, there remain a plethora of tools that remain 
untested. Of primary concern is the prevalence of the use of tools in situations that 
affect legal outcomes and human lives without the tools being validated with 





In addition to specific issues related to validation of tools, there are additional 
challenges that digital forensics tools share with most other sectors in the software 
markets. Two of these issues that are particularly impactful are the uncontrolled 
proliferation of new tools and the lack of education in proper and appropriate use 




As new technology emerges, so do the new tools. Long gone are the simple days 
where looking at hard drives alone was sufficient. The taxonomy of forensics tools 
has grown to include items such as GPS forensics, drone forensics and VoIP 
forensics. There are at present 32 different categories of tools. With new tools 
coming out and at such a pace, there is hardly time for the tools to mature and there 
is little time or manpower available to test all of the new tools. For many 
investigators low cost, easy access, and easy to use are often the major factors in 
tool selection. Yet these are not necessarily the measures that should be used in the 
determination of the tool to use. 
 
Education about Tools 
 
Many tools are released to the public and then used but without formal training. All 
tools have their quirks and use cases. Sometimes they are obvious but other times 
not. In the preceding examples with Encase and FTK testing, why would 3 gif files 
not show up when a graphic file carver is run? The answer to this question may 
have important bearing on a digital forensics case and could potentially change the 
classification of the crime when the number of images on a computer is a 
determining factor.  
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While the NIST plan provides a solid foundation to improve the state of digital 
forensics tools, there doesn’t appear to be a structured approach for continuous 
process improvement from a presumably unbiased perspective. While the test 
reports do bring issues to light, the lack of a structured process diminishes the value 
of the collection as a current method for validating tools.  
 
Clearly, there is a need for greater tool testing and reporting. To impart this need to 
future forensic investigators, tool testing should become part of the forensic 
curriculum. Available on the NIST the CFTT Federated Testing Forensic Tool 
Environment is a live Linux CD iso file that can be used for testing disk imaging 
tools, hardware write block tools and mobile device tools (NIST Tool Catalog). 
Introducing this a college forensic curriculum can teach students how to test tools, 
to learn about the functions and limitations of a tool, and most importantly, show 
them the importance of testing a tool before using it for investigations.  
 
Forensic analysts need to become familiar with the reports that do exist and be 
aware of the limitations and anomalies that can arise from the use of a tool. Because 
a tool is listed on the NIST Catalog site does not mean a thorough examination of 
the tool was done or that a report on it exists. Sophisticated adversaries may do their 
own testing to find the limitations of a tool and exploit the weakness of the tool to 
prevent information from being discovered by the tool.  
 
Defense attorneys may seize upon this issue of tools used that lack the proper testing 
and reporting. A good lawyer may call tools used to gather evidence into question. 
If the tool has significant problems when used in certain operating systems or 
settings, this may help them reach their goal of establishing reasonable doubt.  
 
Finally, this reinforces the need for using multiple tools when analyzing evidence. 
While it may add time to an investigation, one tool can mitigate the issues of 
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